Abstract-Considering the case of players' deceptions, traditional secret sharing scheme can not resolve the security issues. To address these security issues, the paper proposes a rational secret sharing scheme against cheating based on game theory. Under the conditions of the rational, applying the idea of threshold, the scheme is composed of key generation, share encryption, verification and secret reconstruction. In the process, the scheme firstly utilizes secure multiparty computation function instead of trusted center for key generation and share validation; secondly uses probability encryption which can effectively solve the problem of players keeping silent in the final iteration; thirdly without revealing the secret, employs the commitment to detect the cheat in the scheme; finally, the scheme can reconstruct the secret in the meaningful encryption. In conclusion, the scheme is safe and effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
(n, m) threshold secret sharing which was firstly proposed by Sharmir [1] and Blakey [2] separately in 1979 has solved the problems of information storage, digital signature and so on. With the wide application of network, scholars focus on the security research about secret sharing, especially the secret sharing against cheating, and they have presented many solutions for solving the security problems[3~7], such as Chor protocol [3] , Feldman protocol [4] and Harn protocol [5] , etc..
Rational secret sharing (RSS) scheme was first proposed by Halpern and Teague in [8] , the paper discussed rational participants who want to maximize the utility function to execute the protocol, pointed out the problem that players keep silent in the last round of the backward induction without punishment for the action and gave the (n, m) ( n m ≤ ≤ 3 ) scheme which based on the surviving iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. However, the trusted center always involved. The solutions of [9] introduced the (2, 2) RSS scheme based on [8] eliminated the trusted center and achieved the fairness through the broadcast channel, but only considered one player deviates. The works of [10] gave an exact RSS scheme which based on the computational Nash equilibrium and the theory of trembles hand, implementing the fairness by point-to-point network and reconstructing a sequence of fake iterations followed by a single real iteration to make players not guess the last iteration, but had the problem of more than m participants to cheat. The solutions of [11, 12, 13] relied on physical assumptions such as secure envelopes and ballot boxes which can broadcast and exchange, but these schemes were too idealistic, and did not have high feasibility. The works of [14, 15] solved the cheat problem in traditional protocol which based on the repeated games, but the players still guess the secret so that they will keep silent in the last round. The protocol in [16] used synchronization channel under the model of an honest minority and a rational majority, but the players who comply with the protocol not getting the secret with low probability.
Because of the final iteration of keeping silent, the continual involvement of the trusted center and the problem of actual communication channel, the above schemes can not fundamentally solve the issues of deception and collusion, so the paper presents a new fair RSS scheme which combines game theory and cryptographic protocol based on the works of [17] and solve the deficiencies in the above schemes.
II. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A. Basic concepts
Define 1 If a vector of strategies is a computational Nash equilibrium [18] , [19] is the process of reasoning backwards in time, from the end of a problem or situation, to determine a sequence of optimal actions. It proceeds by first considering the last time a decision might be made and choosing what to do in any situation at that time. Using this information, one can then determine what to do at the second-to-last time of decision. This process continues backwards until one has determined the best action for every possible situation at every point time. [22] . If E has a special property: even players have unbounded computational power, some public keys of it yield ciphertexts that cannot be decrypted, and we call the keys are meaningless and the other keys are meaningful.
Step 1 Select two distinct large prime numbers p and q, and calculate q p n ⋅ =
. Choose x which is a random quadratic non-residue of n with probability β meets Jacobi Symbol
Step 2 Publish public key (n, x) and keep private key (p, q) secret.
Step 3 Random and uniformly choose for each bit of the plaintext message and calculate Eq.1 to obtain ciphertext .
Choose x which is the quadratic residue of n with probability 1-β , and is the quadratic residue of n, either is 0 or 1.
Step 4 When x is the quadratic non-residue of n with probability β , and it meets Jacobi Symbol 1 ) ( = n x . So can be decrypted by Eq.2.
( )is the quadratic residue of n 1 ( ) is the quadratic non-residue of n
(2) When x is a quadratic residue of n with probability 1-β , the decryption result of is 0. So it is impossible to decrypt the ciphertext .
III. RATIONAL SECRET SHARING SCHEME The paper proposes a (n, m) rational secret sharing scheme which uses the define 4 to resolve the problems of players keeping silent in the last round of backward induction of game theory and replace trusted center with SMPC. The scheme distributes the shares of secret and verifies information to every player; in the process of implementing the protocol, players generate the private keys which will be shared between the players and public key which will be published through SMPC function; then players encrypt the share with the public key and broadcast these ciphertexts. The legitimacy of the ciphertexts will be proved by another SMPC function. Without inputting the share in the verification process, scheme will not reveal any information about the share of the secret. After a series of proof, the shares producing the private key are broadcast, and allow the players to generate the private key and check whether the public key is meaningful or not. If it is meaningful, other players can decrypt the share and reconstruct the secret. Otherwise, the protocol will enter the next round.
A. Scheme Initialization
The dealer chooses two large prime numbers p and q, where q|p-1. g is the primitive element of p Z , H(x, y) represents a two-variable one-way function which maps x and y to a fixed length. There is a notice board (NB) from which players can only read the information. And only the dealer has the right to add, delete and change the context of the notice board. The dealer publishes the value of (p, q, H).
B. Share Generation
The dealer can use the following steps to distribute these shares among n players:
Step 1 The dealer randomly chooses an integer r, and computes the value of . Then checks whether the value of is equal to that of when 
C. Key Generation
Players run an SMPC function to generate key.
Step 1 Choose n random strings , of length k+s where s is the iteration number and k is the initial security parameter.
Step 2 Randomly choose large prime numbers and , of length k+s, construct polynomials Step 4 Publicly output the public key (N ,x), commitment , and ( 
F. Secret Reconstruction
Step 1 If all_honst=true, all players simultaneously broadcast .
Step 2 Player i computes the first two stages of validation, if there exists players' commitments don't match the open values, then terminate the protocol.
Step 3 If pub_key is meaningful, then get the share .
According to the Shamir secret sharing scheme, if the number of the participants is at least m or more, players can reconstruct the secret S=F(0) using Eq.6, and exit the protocol. , i i y t
Step 2 The dealer needs to calculate , and updates on the NB using . All players except can prove the correctness of their shares as follows:
That is to say, satisfies the formula:
Therefore, the dealer who wants to remove some players, needs to compute and , and other players need not to make any change.
According to the importance of the participants, the dealer distributes different secret shares to participants for achieving the classification scheme. The participant who can master many secret shares is called privileged member, and the set of these members is known as privilege sets. Privileged member who only need one private key can obtain many secret shares in the process of secret reconstruction. So they hlod privileges.
Step 
Step 2 Publish on the NB. 
B. The scheme has the advantages of traditional secret sharing in security.
When the number of any subset of all the players is less than m in the meaningful iteration, they can't reconstruct the polynomial F(x) and can't get any information about secret s. Otherwise they can successfully recover the unique polynomial F(x) and the secret in the meaningful iteration; under the condition of not changing the secret share of original members, the dealer can add new players as long as the total number not exceeding n; the dealer can delete some players through choosing zero as the polynomial of the constant item; in term of the important of the players, the dealer can achieve the classification scheme.
C. The scheme implements the rational secret sharing without trusted center.
The dealer only distributes the initial secret shares. And in every secret reconstruction iteration, all players run SMPC function to generate the public and private keys and verify legality of the other players. Therefore, the scheme can avoid authority deception.
D. The commitment is secure.
The commitment for random number has certainty in the reconstruction phase of the scheme. Although there are many pairs of ( ) corresponded to players to not be found. It is impossible for illegal players to obtain the value of through the value of , because it has to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Applying the related knowledge of computed games in game theory and classical secret sharing scheme, this paper constructs a new rational secret sharing scheme against cheating and coalitions. Compared with the traditional secret sharing scheme, this scheme combines the payoff function of game theory and the probabilistic encryption and is composed of key generation, verification and secret reconstruction. In the process of key generation, fully utilizing threshold theory, players run SMPC function to generate the shares of public key which be used to encrypt and verify ,and private key corresponding to public key and the commitment information. In the reconstruction stage, the scheme provides the appropriate authentication method to solve the problem of players keeping silent in the last iteration, checks the cheat of the internal and illegal members to achieve anti-cheat; rational players can implement the compute Nash equilibrium through running the protocol. Through analysis, the scheme is feasible and has the capacity of anti-passive attacks against (m-1) collusions without the trusted center. Therefore, the scheme is safe and effective.
